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KIERKEGAARD'S "THREE STAGES": 
A PILGRIM'S REGRESS? 
David W. Aiken 
The purpose of this paper is to explore an hypothesis rather than draw any 
unassailable conclusions. I argue that there is a fundamental tension 
between the sub-Christian account of the "Three Stages" presented in the 
earlier pseudonymous writings and the explicitly Christian account pre-
sented in the Anti-Climacean and later acknowledged writings. The earlier 
version is that of a progress from spiritless "immediacy" toward more com-
plete integrations of the self, culminating in authentic religious faith; while 
the later is that of a regress from lesser to ever greater forms of spiritual 
peril, culminating in a disordered religiosity that vainly seeks to overthrow 
the established ecclesiastical order. Tracing the conflict between these two 
perspectives also enhances our understanding of the purpose underlying 
Kierkegaard's project by suggesting the possibility that the authorship con-
stitutes a literary confession of Kierkegaard's own spiritual regress. 
One of the most celebrated-and disputed-aspects of Kierkegaard's 
philosophy is his doctrine of the "three stages" [Stadicr] or "spheres" 
[Sfa'rer] of existence. Not only is the pseudonymous authorship struc-
tured according to a succession of aesthetic, ethical, and religious per-
spectives, but Kierkegaard's Journals, both early and late, reveal their 
author's preoccupation with these contrasting orientations and the 
"pathos-laden" tensions that result from their collision. Though 
Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms offer various interpretations of the 
stages as their divergent purposes require, the task of distilling an essen-
tial definition falls to Johannes Climacus: 
... While aesthetic existence is essentially enjoyment, ethical 
existence is struggle and victory, religious existence is suffering, 
not as a transitional moment, but as persisting.1 
Despite the clarity of Climacus's formulation, the fluid and some-
times inconsistent treatment of the "qualitative dialectic" found in vari-
ous phases of the authorship has engendered endless interpretive diffi-
culties, many of which continue to divide scholarly opinion: Did 
Kierkegaard intend the notion of existence-spheres to function primarily 
as a literary framework for his pseudonyms or was he advancing a sub-
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stantive theory of human nature?2 If the latter alternative obtains, does 
this theory present us with three incompatible and idealized human 
types, or is Kierkegaard positing some kind of developmental psycholo-
gy?3 If, as the pseudonyms insist, the transition from one existence-
sphere to another can never be effected by a logical transition of thought 
but only by means of a passionate leap, does it follow that the embracing 
of one stage requires a renunciation of the others-or do the lower 
become sublated in the higher?4 
However important these problems may be, I do not propose to 
address them directly in this essay, but rather to explore a preliminary 
question whose clarification may well prove helpful for resolving the 
enigma of the stages: If these existence-spheres constitute successive 
intensifications of subjectivity in the life of the individual, does it follow 
that they also involve an advance toward human fulfillment or perfec-
tion? Now one way of deriving an affirmative answer would be to per-
form the following deduction: subjectivity, as Climacus asserts, is truth; 
subjective truth delivers from self-deception as it strengthens one's 
earnest resolve to live transparently before God; hence, every qualitative 
enhancement of subjectivity entails a commensurately higher integration 
of the self. But if the self's fullest integrity is attainable only within the 
religious sphere, it follows that the trajectory of the stages must be con-
strued as a progress toward increasingly authentic forms of human exis-
tence. Indeed, the interior pilgrimage from contented worldliness-the 
lowest form of aesthetic existence-to self-abandonment in paradoxical 
faith-the highest form of religiosity-would seem to follow an ascend-
ing path strikingly similar to the purgative, illuminative, and unitive 
ways of classical apophatic mysticism. 
Before we consign Kierkegaard to the Cloud of Unknowing, however, 
we must confront some unsettling doubts: Is the line of reasoning I have 
traced above too smooth and certain to describe the rough and perilous 
terrain of passionate inwardness? Does it do justice to the self-subvert-
ing irony inscribed in the various pseudonymous accounts of each 
sphere? Moreover, even if it could be established that the pseudonyms 
from Either/Or through the Conlcuding Postscript invite the reader to 
embark on a "pilgrim's progress" through the stages, does it necessarily 
follow that Kierkegaard agrees with them in this matter? The chief rea-
son for my affirmative response to the first question and my negative 
response to the others hinges on a peculiar discrepancy-even a dispari-
ty-between the Christian and sub-Christian accounts of the stages in 
Kierkegaard's authorship; but in order fully to explain this divergence it 
will be necessary to trace in some detail the outlines of each standpoint. 
1. The Sub-Christian Standpoint: A Brief Sketch 
Despite their evident differences, the "sub-Christian" pseudonyms 
concur in regarding the stages as a progress from spiritless "immediacy" 
toward fuller and more authentic integrations of the self's constituent 
functions. So, for instance, Judge William presents his ethical world-
and life-view as a positive advance in the direction of self-realization as 
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over against the trivial routines of the philistine conformist and the aim-
less presentiments of the romantic poet. From the Assessor's stand-
point, both forms of aesthetic existence dissolve one's capacity for spiri-
tual integrity in such a way that one loses "the inmost and holiest thing 
of all in a [human being], the unifying power of personality" 
[Personlighedens bindende Magt).' Such individuals "live their lives, as it 
were, outside themselves, they vanish like shadows, their immortal soul 
is blown away, and they are not alarmed by the problem of immortality, 
because they are already in a state of dissolution before they die." [EO II, 
p. 172] Moreover, the reflective Aesthete from the First Volume of 
Either/Or, would seem implicitly to agree with Judge William's assess-
ment of his spiritual condition. In broken aphorisms and disfigured 
verse, he confesses the extent to which his life has become barren of pur-
pose and empty of meaning: 
And thus I ... am bound in a chain formed of dark imagin-
ings, of unquiet dreams and restless thoughts, of dread presenti-
ments and inexplicable anxieties .... 
I do not care for anything. I do not care to ride, for the exer-
cise is too violent, I do not care to walk, walking is too strenu-
ous. I do not care to lie down, for I should either have to remain 
lying, and I do not care to do that, or I should have to get up 
again, and I do not care to do that either. Summa Summarum: I 
do not care at all.6 
Thus impelled by what Anti-Climacus calls the despair of possibility/ 
the disillusioned poet hovers perpetually in ironical dissatisfaction 
above concrete actuality in all its apparent baseness, refusing to 
acknowledge those finite limitations which form an integral component 
the self.' Before he can make the leap into the ethical sphere the 
Aesthete must be willing freely to fashion himself out of the given mate-
rial of his own history. [EO II, p. 263] Nor is this task totally beyond his 
power, for according to the Judge everyone "can, if he will, become the 
paradigmatic man, not by wiping out his accidentality [Tilfcrldighed], but 
by remaining in it and ennobling it. But he ennobles it by choosing it." 
[EO II, p. 266] In this respect the aspiring ethicist must be willing to 
accept the burden of his existence and thereby become, in effect, "his 
own providence [Forsyn]." [EO II, p. 287] The Judge accordingly pro-
claims that his progress toward spiritual integrity is chiefly the result of 
his own work, undertaken "in such a way that even what has befallen me 
is by me transformed." [EO II, p. 255]" 
The two Johannes pseudonyms, however, detect a fallacy in Judge 
William's reasoning which points to the untenability of an autonomous 
ethical existence. Ethicism, in and for itself, cannot attain its wonted 
telos, for the transformation of personal existence from spiritlessness to 
integrity (that state which Climacus calls en evige Salighed or "an eternal 
blessedness") demands more than a resolute act of self-appropriation: it 
requires also a renunciation of that volitional autonomy upon which eth-
ical existence is founded. 
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In his "Panegyric on Abraham," Johannes de Silentio confirms Judge 
William's conviction that apart from ethicism's passionate self-concern 
nothing remains for the finite existent but despair over the transitoriness 
of all temporal phenomena. lO But he also goes futher than the Judge in 
confessing that greatness of soul must be proportionate to the object of 
one's earnest striving, and consequently that there is a telos higher than 
that of self-legislation: 
... For he who strove with the world became great by over-
coming the world, and he who strove with himself [i.e. Judge 
William] became great by overcoming himself, but he who strove 
with God [i.e. Abraham] became greater than all. [FT, p. 31] 
As over against the Judge's counsel, Silentio recognizes that the one 
who would ascend from autonomous moralism to religious faith must 
confess the incapacity of the self's finite volitional powers to achieve 
integrity apart from divine assistance. The religious indvidual accord-
ingly finds his elevation, his paradoxical "greatness," by means of that 
power "whose strength is impotence," that wisdom "whose secret is 
foolishness," that hope "whose form is madness," and that love "which 
is hatred of one's self." [FT, p. 31] 
If the aesthete falls short of spiritual integrity through inadequate 
self-concern, then it appears that the ethicist misses the mark through 
inordinate self-confidence. Only by resigning oneself to the incommen-
surability between the ethical ideal and its finite enactment can one 
make a decisive advance beyond Judge William's self-satisfied accomo-
dation to matters of penultimate concern, such as his domestic and civic 
responsibilities. But higher still than the impassive piety of infinite res-
ignation and the confession of radical insufficiency it exacts is religious 
faith "by reason of the absurd." The latter confidently believes and 
hopes all things, relying as it does on that Power for Whom nothing is 
impossible-not even the reinstatement of finite goods and the purifica-
tion of the intention which aims for them. So Abraham, the biblical 
exemplar of such faith, held fast-in a wisdom transcending all natural 
modes of cognition-to the hope that his son would be restored to him. 
[FT,pp.35,45,48,51,60] 
Despite his evident agreement with the author of Fear and Trembling 
on the essential nature of the religious stage, Johannes Climacus 
advances a number of corrections and refinements which significantly 
alter Silentio's account of this existence-sphere. First of all, Climacus is 
convinced that the "Knight of Faith" is far too abstract to furnish an ade-
quate paradigm for religious existence. [CUP, p. 47n] In particular, 
Silentio's "foreshortened" or ideal viewpoint misses the protracted suf-
fering that accompanies one's effort to sustain the "infinite movement" 
of paradoxical faith within the constraints of finitude. The Knight of 
Faith may indeed hope all things, but this fact does not mitigate-
indeed, it intensifies-the struggle to discern the will of God in a partic-
ular concrete situation. II 
In addition to its unwarranted idealism, Silentio's account of faith is 
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also incomplete insofar as it fails to distinguish sufficiently between the 
immanent and transcendent perspectives within the religious sphere. 
According to Climacus, there is a preliminary form of religiosity which 
is congruent with ethicism in its emphasis on unconditional obligation 
but qualitatively higher in its acknowledgement of "total guilt." [CUP, 
pp. 468-471] The ethicist may indeed find himself required to disavow a 
particular culpable act; the immanent religionist, on the other hand, 
repents of finite existence in its totality. Thus it would appear that Judge 
William has fallen prey to a subtle form of self-deception by confound-
ing the loftiness of a moral ideal with the spiritual integrity of the one 
disposed to enact it. "I ought" may well imply "I can" as a matter of eth-
ical theory; in practice, however, the intrinsic merit of this Kantian prin-
ciple is powerless to make its practitioner meritorious. [CUP, p. 469)12 
The advantage of immanent religiosity over ethical idealism thus con-
sists in the recognition that with every effort to fulfill an obligation, the 
eternal standard has already declared one guilty. The very attempt at 
self-exoneration is in truth a self-denunciation. [CUP, p. 471] 
With this "eternal recollection" [evige Erindren] of guilt, however, 
comes the awareness that there is an absolute, benevolent, and sustain-
ing Power who "embraces the exister on all sides," comiserating and co-
operating with the culpable individual in the ethico-religious struggle. 
[CUP, p. 474; see also pp. 508, 515-519] Now if God's personal presence 
is recollected in and with the appropriation of "total guilt," then one's 
point of access to divine absolution is to be found within one's own sub-
jectivity. [CUP, pp. 471, 475, 477-478, 480-481] Though religious faith 
first encounters God in this inward epiphany, thereby giving rise to 
what Climacus calls "Religion A," the final stage of existence has not yet 
been reached: for by adhering to the socratic insight that the Eternal is 
accessible through an intensification of inwardness, the immanent 
believer fails to acknowledge the more primordial untruth [Usandheden] 
of subjectivity. [CUP, pp. 178-180, 186] The existing individual, howev-
er, "cannot be untruth eternally, or eternally be presupposed as having 
been in untruth; [one] must have been brought to this condition in time, 
or have become untruth in time." [CUP, p. 186] But if the highest truth 
afforded to subjectivity consists in the discovery of the subject's funda-
mental untruth, then the socratic way of recollection has become insu-
perably blocked. [CUP, p.186.] Consequently, the point of departure for 
this new and transcendent form of religiosity consists in sin-conscious-
ness, in the confession that one has always and already offended the 
God whose absolving presence one seeks to recollect. From the perspec-
tive of "Religion B," therefore, the "eternal essential truth" is no longer 
"behind" the individual but "in front of him, as the absolute which has 
come into being within time." [CUP, p. 187] 
Forsaking the immanent or socratic Deity, paradoxical faith presses 
forward to meet the God-Man. To complete this last and most strenuous 
ascent in the path toward integrity, one must jettison every last support 
of finitude: Enjoyment has been forfeited at the outset, for the ethical 
demanded that it be left behind; self-sufficiency, too, has been relin-
quished at the religious turn; but now subjective autonomy must be 
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foregone, and with it (severest abandonment of all!) the precious wis-
dom of Socrates, the truth of inwardness that furnished both compass 
and nourishment from the beginning of the way. So must one approach 
the Throne of Grace empty-handed. It is little wonder, then, that the 
two Johanneses, clinging anxiously to their "enclosed" subjectivity, 
remain unable and unwilling to make this last ascent. 
II. The Christian Standpoint: A Dialectical Reversal 
We may presume, however, that Kierkegaard and his decisively 
Christian pseudonym, Anti-Climacus, have at least attempted to scale 
this final height. And from their standpoint a most peculiar paradox 
comes into view: in existence there is no ascentY This unforseen conclu-
sion to the qualitative dialectic fundamentally calls into question the 
progressive view of the stages presupposed by the sub-Christian pseu-
donyms (despite their various internescine disputes). According to 
Anti-Climacus's counsel of Christian perfection, all forms of subjectivi-
ty-from philistine spiritless ness through the most sublime reaches of 
ethical and religious inwardness-must be consigned to despair.14 
Moreover, despair is sin regardless of whether it is implicit and sup-
pressed or explicit and confessed. [SUD, pp. 77, 81-82, 100-102] Now if 
offense at the God-Man represents the furthest extremity of such 
despair, and if it flourishes primarily in the domain of transcendent reli-
giosity, then the final stage of existence does not guarantee the attain-
ment of integrity, but rather delivers one over to the greatest spiritual 
peril. [SUD, pp. 113ff, 125ff] 
To be sure, Johannes Climacus had recognized that the "eternal recol-
lection of guilt" does not of itself propel the existing individual toward 
the appropriation of divine absolution, for the leap from "Religion A" to 
Christianity cannot be effected simply by the immanent content of con-
sciousness: room must be made in the qualitative dialectic for the 
inscrutible operation of free choice. Nevertheless, Climacus, true to his 
name,'s clearly intends his Concluding Postscript to show how each stage 
of existence represents a positive enhancement of subjectivity over its 
predecessor, how each rung on the ladder of perfection brings the self 
closer to the beatitude which it passionately-and ever more passionate-
ly-seeks. For all his anti-hegelian polemics, Climacus never entirely 
dispenses with the principle of sublating synthesis. Just as Judge 
William requires that the aesthetic be dethroned but not destroyed, so 
also Climacus assumes, perhaps all too gratuitously, that a purified ethi-
cal subjectivity will ultimately be restored in some way to the empty-
handed supplicant. 
Lest we, like Climacus, seek a hasty refuge from omnivorous negativ-
ity in the solace of an Aufhebung, Kierkegaard is concerned in his explic-
itly Christian writings to impose an existential halt upon his readers: 
Granted that faith embraces-in fact, requires-obedience, what precise-
ly does an enactment of the specifically Christian good entail, and does 
this transcendent tclos perhaps stand all purely human valuations on 
their head? Anti-Climacus sermonizes most eloquently on the gospel 
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invitation, "Come unto me all ye who are heavy laden, and I will give 
you rest," at the outset of his treatise on Christian praxis; but he abruptly 
forestalls the reader's incipient consolation by insisting that this call 
issues from Christ in His humiliation rather than in His glorification.16 
Moreover, if there is any ethical moment restored in transcendent reli-
giosity, this new obedience does not primarily consist in the cultivation 
of interiority, for this effort would simply provide human autonomy 
with another occasion to justify itself; rather, the Christian's obligation is 
ever to follow after the Suffering Servant in the present and unremitting 
expectation of persecution and martyrdom. [TIC, pp. 108-109, 115-122, 
194-196, 214ff] But the difficulty of this task is so great that it may well 
occasion an "offense of obedience" wherein the religious individual 
undermines the severity of the Prototype's demand by confusing the 
recognition of the task with its fulfillment." Imagination may be an 
indispensible ally in the ascent to faith insofar as it enables us to envi-
sion the religious life in all earnestness, but it can also betray us when 
the moment of reduplication is at hand. ls 
This dialectical reversal serves to highlight the qualitative difference 
which separates the two accounts of the stages in Kierkegaard's author-
ship. The first, and sub-Christian, version regards the aesthetic, the ethi-
cal, and the religious according to their respective essences-insofar as it 
posits these forms of life as ideal possibilities. From this "essentialist" 
perspective, the trajectory of the stages represents an ascending hierar-
chy of principles according to which the subjective life of the individual 
may be organized: The aesthetic life is grounded in the principle of 
maximum enjoyment; and whether the desired object be immediately 
apprehended (as with the "bourgeois philistine") or reflectively pursued 
(as with the romantic poet), it nevertheless constitutes an end insuffi-
ciently worthy to secure and sustain personal integrity. In resolute striv-
ing, on the other hand, the ethical life owns a fundamental option quali-
tatively higher and thus of greater intrinsic merit, insofar as it orients 
itself toward a telos that obtains eternally and obliges unconditionally. 
But religious faith comports the highest of all principles by abandoning 
itself to divine grace as anticipated inwardly in the concern for an eter-
nal happiness and as manifested historically in the person of Christ. 
The second and explicitly Christian understanding of the stages pro-
ceeds from the recognition that between the principle and its enactment 
falls the shadow of sin. The Christian account must accordingly 
approach the stages from the side of existence rather than essence by 
reckoning more thoroughly with the pervasiveness of self-deception and 
the fragility of human virtue. Thus from the existential standpoint the 
aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious (including much that goes by the 
name of Christian religiosity) must be viewed as modes of fallen subjec-
tivity.19 Within the experience of the concrete individual, the "disrela-
tion" of sin vitiates the essential qualities of every existence-sphere, so 
that enjoyment becomes aesthetic despair, striving becomes ethical 
despair, and believing becomes religious despair. 
Furthermore, the succession of stages involves ever more perilous 
and culpable forms of despair. The Aesthete from Either/Or clearly 
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views his existential predicament as that than which no greater can be 
conceived; but Judge William correctly dismisses his epistolary compan-
ion's self-assessment as so much poetic posturing. The Judge argues 
that no-one really knows despair until that person assumes the burden-
some task of self-appropriation before the Eternal Good, but this project 
can only be undertaken once the aesthetic stage has been abandoned. 
[EO II, pp. 181-2; 210-212; 215-218] So also the self-enclosing despair to 
which the autonomous ethicist falls prey, when she discovers that her 
culpability is more primordial and intractable than she ever supposed, 
can only be acknowledged and confessed coram Deo-that is, from with-
in the religious sphere. [EO II, pp. 343ff] Yet (to invert a Heideggerian 
maxim) where the saving power grows, there also the risk matures:20 for 
the one who exists in defiant despair before the God in Time may not, in 
the end, accept the terms of divine reconciliation and thereby find heal-
ing for the sickness unto death, especially since those terms require one 
to follow Christ to Gesthemane and Golgotha. 
Indeed, a cursory glance at the Anti-Climacean writings and later reli-
gious dicourses reveals that their pages are peopled far less with saints 
and martyrs and far more with treacherous disciples all too zealous to 
betray the God-Man with a kiss of disobedient faith. It is idle to argue 
that these betrayers have simply missed the point of "Religion B": for 
they stand firmly upon the Mount of Transfiguration; they have made 
the good confession; they have seen the light. But what the light of 
grace discloses of their own wretchedness and of the Suffering Servant's 
majesty is too terrifying for them to countenance; offended, they turn 
aside their faces toward the safe precincts of established Christendom. 
Ill. Kierkegaard's Literary Project: A Singular Confession 
Who, then, are these offended believers, these pilgrims regressing ever 
further into the despair of disobedient faith? At least one face among them 
is clearly identifiable: it is that of an earnest reformer, wearied through 
long years of fruitless crusading against an institution which regarded him 
first as a harmless eccentric, then as a disagreeable malcontent, and finally 
as a dangerous embarassment to corporate prestige who must be silenced 
by being resolutely ignored. Indeed, it is Kierkegaard himself: the one 
who, like us, averts his eyes from the sharp clarity of the Christian require-
ment; the one who, in the end, chose to remain the socratic conscience 
within a treacherous ecclesiastical body rather than effect that still more 
disastrous betrayal of the God-Man to which he was temperamentally 
inclined.2! For, as Kierkegaard muses in Judge For Yourselves!: 
... the evil in our time is not the Established Church [det 
Bestaaende] with all its many faults; no, the evil in our time is pre-
cisely this evil lust ronde lust], this flirting with the will to reform, 
this hypocricy of seeking escape from the consciousness of one's 
own incapacity by the diversion of wishing to reform the 
Church, a thing which our time is least of all capable of doing. 
[JFS, p. 220; the italics are original] 
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This "evil lust" is nothing other than the impotent rage of the zealot 
and thus not to be confused with an authentic reformer's passion for 
social justice. Like Judas, his biblical prototype, the overzealous 
reformer refuses "[to] understand the slowness of the Good; that out of 
mercy the Good is slow; that out of love for free persons, it will not use 
force .... [H]e will not humbly understand that the Good can get on 
without him."22 
Anyone familiar with the details of Kierkegaard's life and with the 
countless Journal entries in which the Danish Philosopher struggles, 
before God, to define his singular religious vocation will recognize the 
confessional nature of these passages. And in this recognition a further 
possibility presents itself-namely, that the qualitative dialectic of the 
stages may well be more than just a literary framework: it may also be 
an act of self-disclosure. 
Though I would strongly reject an exclusively psychological or auto-
biographical interpretation of Kierkegaard's writings, it is nevertheless 
difficult for the attentive reader who juxtaposes pseudonymous and 
acknowledged texts with contemporaneous Journal entries to resist con-
cluding that Kierkegaard himself traversed those stages of existence 
whose characteristics he describes with such uncanny phenomenological 
acuity. From this standpoint, it is Kierkegaard himself who appears as 
the despairing poet, the prideful moralist, the self-enclosed subjectivist, 
the treacherous disciple-and perhaps above all as the one who was 
unable to master his own irony. Moreover, the disparity between the 
"essential" and "existential" interpretations of the stages, to which I 
have called attention above, may also have confessional significance. By 
building this uncanny dualism into the very structure of the authorship, 
Kierkegaard signals his reader that he was in fact unable to make the 
ascent prescribed by the fundamental principles of his qualitative dialec-
tic, and that he consequently had regressed from the disobedient faith of 
the religious poet toward the treacherous faith of the overzealous 
reformer. Why else would he have expended such dialectical effort to 
distinguish his mission from that of the fanatical extra ordinarius 
Magister Adler, unless the latter represented a kind of alter-ego, a 
"shadow-self," as George Steiner points out in a recent essay?23 
Now if we grant that the stages represent a diagnosis of those ways in 
which Kierkegaard's spiritual health progressively declined, then his lit-
erary career appears as a kind of logotherapy, a protracted confessional 
discourse directed primarily to God and secondarily to the individual 
reader who may be disposed to undertake a similar effort. This conclu-
sion, however, presents us with a seemingly intractible problem: if 
Kierkegaard's writings belong to the category of confessional literature, 
how may we retrieve a philosophical significance from them? One classi-
cal definition of philosophy holds that it is the essential task of this disci-
pline to apprehend that which is true universally or for the most part; on 
this view, the particular qua particular does not fall within the scope of 
theoretical thought since singularity is, strictly speaking, unintelligible. 
But according to its very nature an act of confession, as called forth by 
the particular exigencies of an individual's life and calling, constitutes 
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an unrepeatable event and perhaps also an indecipherable discourse. 
Thus it appears that Kierkegaard's singular confession has become 
philosophically moot in the making. 
One possible way of addressing this problem would be to show that 
at least some confessional literature retains a prophetic import beyond 
those biographical and historical circumstances which shaped its con-
tent. Moreover, this clearly holds in the case of Kierkegaard's author-
ship-and that by design and not by accidenU4 For he explicitly intend-
ed the substance of his confession to serve as an indictment of the spirit-
lessness of his age and as a warning to those future generations which 
he expected to regress still further from obedient faith. Viewed in this 
way, Kierkegaard's literary confession takes on a maieutic aspect and 
thus also an exemplariety not afforded to strictly private self-disclosures. 
Kierkegaard's Journals also attest that he regarded his philosophical 
mission as a corrective for the sins of the age, fatally compromised 
though it was by his self-defeating dialectic of reticence and overzeal-
ousness.25 And in what does this corrective consist? Kierkegaard gives 
his readers a forthright summary of it in the "Moral" which he append-
ed to the First Part of Training in Christianity: 
And what does all this mean? It means that everyone for 
himself, in quiet inwardness before God, shall humble himself 
before what it means in the strictest sense to be a Christian, 
admit candidly before God how it stands with him, so that he 
might yet accept the grace which is offered to everyone who is 
imperfect, that is, to everyone ... 
"But if the Christian life is something so ... frightful, how in 
the world can a person get the idea of accepting it?" Quite sim-
ply, and, if you want that too, quite in a Lutheran way: only the 
consciousness of sin [Syndens Bevidsthed] can force one into this 
dreadful situation [Rcrdsel]-the power on the other side being 
grace. And in that very instant the Christian life transforms 
itself and is sheer gentleness, grace, loving-kindness and com-
passion. Looked at from any other point of view Christianity is 
and must be a sort of madness or the greatest horror. Only 
through consciousness of sin is there entrance to it, and the wish 
to enter by any other way is the crime of lese mafeste against 
Christianity. [TIC, p. 71] 
It would seem, then, that two purposes govern Kierkegaard's confes-
sional-literary project: in the first place, to show how he came to 
acknowledge his offence at the severity of the Christian gospel and to 
believe that his sins were forgotten as well as forgiven;26 and in the sec-
ond place to encourage his readers to follow a similar trajectory from 
conviction of sin, through the confession of spiritual incapacity, to accep-
tance of divine grace. As a Lutheran prophet and evangelist, 
Kierkegaard recognizes that if any spiritual therapy is to be viable, the 
"cure" must in a sense precede the diagnosis: for the terror of the Law has 
greatest medicinal value for those who are at least beginning to trust in 
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its vicarious fulfillment. On the other hand, as one adept in the socratic 
method, Kierkegaard realizes that this very therapy must itself be admin-
istered vicariously, for otherwise (like the Grace to which it bears wit-
ness) it may be taken in vain. It was for this latter reason that 
Kierkegaard resorted to authorial incognito and was prompted to with-
draw the "Moral" (quoted above) from Training in Christianity. Though 
this passage, in my estimation, states most explictly the corrective pur-
poses for which Kierkegaard designed his literary confession, it was this 
very directness that caused his serious misgivings.27 For in the context of 
a nominally Lutheran Christendom, the prescribing of an authentically 
"Lutheran" therapy might well come to be regarded as a redundancy 
and a commonplace. Kierkegaard realized that the corrective-which, in 
principle, begins and ends in grace-must not be made to seem too easy; 
it must challenge even as it consoles. Consequently, he turned from 
maieutic indirection to stern admonition at the final stage of his career. 
At this point, one might be inclined to object to this overtly religious 
reading of Kierkegaard's literary vocation on the grounds that it seems 
too tidy, too reassuring, and insufficiently attuned to the irony that per-
vades even his explicitly Christian writings. Have I thus attempted to 
draw conclusions where none are to be found? Perhaps so; for if the 
essentialist account of the stages may be shown to founder on the ambi-
guities of existence, it would seem that the confessional interpretation 
must be similarly deconstructed. Confession is, after all, a tricky busi-
ness: conceived in the reflective medium of discourse, it must then be 
reduplicated in act. But how does one go about establishing a proper 
correspondence between penitential words and deeds, since both are 
ambiguous signs? This ambiguity is particularly acute in the case of 
one, such as Kierkegaard, for whom the act of writing functions both as 
confession and as penance. Here the form of the act subverts its content, 
not only on account of any suppressed motives we may wish to attribute 
to the author, but more importantly because the very task of confession-
al writing may be a kind of self-deception.28 For what one expresses is 
never exactly what one means, and what one intends to say is seldom 
what one needs to confess. Spiritual directors are well acquainted with 
this phenomenon, as was Augustine, who clearly recognized the necessi-
ty of confessing his confession. But how, then, does one bring closure to 
the process of retractation? If every diavowal must be disavowed, how 
does one even begin? 
It is in reflecting on these disturbing questions that one discovers the 
paradoxical significance of the singular confession; for every act of con-
fessional writing posits an endless regress of ambiguous self-indict-
ments and thereby invites a kind of authorial martyrdom. Moreover, by 
meditating on this exigency of Kierkegaard's literary vocation, one 
comes to view the religious author as a tragic figure, well-hanged on the 
crossbeam of an unavoidable dilemma. He either strives to attain and 
express self-transparency before God, thereby encumbring himself in a 
potentially self-stultifying effort, or else he joins the ranks of the para-
graph-mongers who ply their acadedmic trade in the objective transac-
tions of the lecture-hall, in which case he lapses into self-forgetful specu-
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lation. Both options mislead: the former beckons toward the abyss of 
subjectivity in search of an elusive enlightenment; the latter invites us 
into the miasma of abstraction in the quest for an unattainable certainty. 
This dilemma serves to highlight the difficulty, perhaps even the 
impossibility, of conducting philosophical and theological discourse in the 
form of a confession; for it suggests an unmediatable disjunction between 
a speculation that prescinds from the messy ambiguities of confessional 
writing and a singular self-disclosure that remains indecipherable to 
author and reader alike. If it was Kierkegaard's intention to unite philoso-
phy and spirituality, it would seem that his project was bound to fail. 
Yet over against this skeptical conclusion I would set the example of 
Augustine's Confessions. Despite its many manifestations of undetected 
self-deception, this work manages to combine inwardness and specula-
tion, subjective and objective discourse, ambiguity and transparency, in 
a most winsome counterpoint. Moreover, by inscribing a theological 
treatise within a prayer-a personal address in which both supplicant 
and Deity are relentlessly questioned-Augustine dissolves any disjunc-
tion between philosophy and spirituality. The Confessions thus repre-
sents a singularly instructive instance of theoretical thinking that retains 
existential poignancy while conveying an awareness of the dark mystery 
beyond the flicker of human discourse. More significantly, we find in 
this work a quest for certainty that does not dispense with, but indeed 
requires, the deepest intellectual humility. Given this remarkable coin-
herence of qualities characteristically opposed in modernity, it is partic-
ularly regrettable that Augustine-and his not uncritical follower, 
Kierkegaard-failed to adhere more consistently to the spirit of the 
Confessions. Perhaps by comporting ourselves circumspectly toward this 
ancient paradigm, we can discern the point of departure for religious 
philosophy in a post-modern context. 
Gordon College 
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